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Abstract 
If agency signifies (first definition, and amongst other things) the ability to act, then 
architecturally this power is complex in the sense that it is deployed at one remove, that is, via 
agency (second definition), and such in at least two directions or registers: the agent acts both 
through others and for others.  Taking its clue from an early written building contract, this 
paper discusses the role of the architect as agent in this light.  On the one hand, the role of 
agent can be seen as a parasitical one, an unnecessary burden (financially and morally) on the 
“real” act of construction.  In this sense, we might think of the ideal of a direct and perhaps 
more natural relationship between construction and inhabitant – a relationship unmediated by 
the law, the contract, and agency, a relationship where the architect is redundant.  This status 
of the agent/architect is discussed in relation to Saint Paul’s notion of “sin” and the possibility 
of a salvation which is linked by Badiou to the gift, kharisma; and the paper concludes by 
positing what the nature of an architectural gift might be. 
 
---------------- 
Costacciaro stands on the Via Flaminia, west of Gubbio; a small fortified town past which the 
Roman road from the capital to Rimini still runs.  In 1477, Francesco di Giorgio Martini was 
formally commissioned as the architect for various works of fortification and civil 
engineering to the body of the town.  The contract is recorded in the Fondo Notarile, prot. 98, 
c,178r of the Gubbio archive as follows: 
In the name of our Lord, Amen.  On the 17th day of May 1477 in the home of my notary.  There being 
present Bartolomeo Antonii Cellis de Villa Vignoli and Fanne Nannis de Castro Turris, and Rentio Spagne 
de Villa Submontis Count of Gubbio being called upon as witnesses to the underwritten: 
Franciscus Georgi de Senis [ie Francesco di Giorgio Martini, from Sienna] in the place and in the 
name of the Lord, Federico Duke of Urbino, has given and placed the work described below with Master 
Johanni Jacobi, Master Pietro, the Masters Laurentii, and Master Caleazzo ser Ferandi de Riva Sancti 
Vitalis..; they being present and in accord; namely the construction of a wall at and for the fortified town of 
Coastacciaro, together with certain vaulted water sources placed below the designated ravelin according to 
the prepared designs and specifications.  What touches upon the performance of this work is under the above 
worthy Francesco…. The contractors solemnly promise to construct the above work and do the masonry 
work faithfully and according to the rules of the art and subject to the approval of Francesco himself.  They 
promise to make appropriate foundations and do all the other work needed to complete the effort and fulfil 
the contract in accord with what the prefect [ie architect] Francesco has ordered and will order. 
…The aforesaid contractors have promised to observe and fulfil all these conditions under penalty of 
100 ducats for whoever does not comply.  The aforesaid contractors….herewith undertake to fulfil the 
foregoing and to observe and comply with each and all of the conditions and not to do anything contrary….
1 
 
                                             
1 Quoted in Michael Dechert, City and Fortress in the works of Francesco di Giorgio (unpublished PhD Thesis, 






















Figure 1: Ravelin, Costacciaro, Umbria, Italy, by Francesco di Giorgio, 1477.  






























Figure 2: Defensive tower, Costacciaro, Umbria, Italy, by 
Francesco di Giorgio, 1477.  Photograph: the author. 
 Such contractual arrangements involving client, builder and architect exist to this day.   Those 
involved with “practice” will recognise here the supposedly banal outlines – indeed the 
specifics - of JCT, FIDIC or other standard forms of building contract: the dating; the 
witnesses; the promise on the part of contractors or undertakers to act; the sanction for not so 
acting; the specification; the design; the appeal to common good practice and workmanship 
and so on; all within the auspices of overarching law which allows for and guarantees specific 
legal agreements. 
Who, or what, is here the agent?  Inherent in this contract for performance – in all similar 
contracts - is an ambiguity and complexity regarding the status of agency.  If on the one hand, 
agency means the ability or power to act, and specifically the power to act as a human, 
directly and with choice, with autonomy - then this power is marked, and damaged, by the 
legal structure which is here set up.   This legal structure also one of agency, but this time 
agency in another of its many meanings, or rather in the meaning that is diametrically 
opposed to the first: the meaning of the rerouting of action away from the principal, the 
originator, to someone who represents, to takes the place of the principal.  In short, the 
displacing of action to the agent, the disrupting of agency (first meaning) by agency (second 
meaning). 
We find that agency as action becomes, in these contractual arrangements at Costacciaro, 
always at one remove, and such in at least two directions or registers: the agent acts both 
through others and for others. 
Which of the parties to this contract is, then, ostensibly the agent (second meaning)?  Who 
takes the place of the principal?  We are told explicitly: the architect, Francesco di Giorgio, is 
“in the place of” his master, Federico Duke of Urbino (commonly known as Federico da 
Montefeltro).  The architect takes the place of the client for the purposes of the building 
contract, acts as agent for the client.  The law of agency, including the principle of 
Respondeat Superior codified in British law in the 17th century whereby the agent acts for 
and therefore binds their principal – Federico, in this case – is already at work at this early 
date.  But is this date so early?  We could suppose the opposite – that this date is already late, 
that the possibility of the substitution of agency (action) by agency (agent) is always already 
at work; that is, that agency is constitutive of the subject, of the “for itself”, of that being 
which each of us is (however we may wish to name it), and therefore that as soon as there is 
anything like “the human” there will be agency as well as agency. 
The agent – Francesco di Giorgio - has been clearly identified, we may believe; but his 
presence, ready to act in place of the Duke, is not taken for granted within the contract, 
precisely because he is not actually present.  Those who are present – that is, the witnesses -  
are necessary in order to guarantee a lack of presence, perhaps the ghostly presence, implied 
by these arrangements – a lack of presence not only of the principal (the Duke), but also that 
of Francesco himself, the agent. 
We have so far understated matters as to this operation of agency (second meaning), this 
displacement of agency (first meaning).  Agent-like rerouting structures the whole of the 
Costacciaro contract, and not just that part relating to the Sienese architect.  We have 
supposed that the Duke is the principal, the one on whose behalf the work is carried out, but 
this is a reduction by analysis from the situation there.   The whole of the contract – both 
written and constructed - is done “in the name of our Lord”, that is, not the Lord Duke of 
Urbino, but the godhead.  All parties to the contract stand in the place of and continue on his 
behalf the work of their Lord in heaven.  This overriding authority and agency is carried 
through the more specific route of a second one who is called “Lord”, that is “the Lord, 
Federico Duke of Urbino” in whose further name the work is arranged; and then only via the one who takes his place and speaks on his behalf – the architect, who in turns places the work 
with the contractors. 
What is to be remarked here is not so much the fixed hierarchy of belief within a traditionally-
ordered society, guaranteed by the godhead and giving authority to the Duke, but rather the 
iterated structure of substitutions – of agency - which gives this hierarchy its possibility and 
which thus precedes any such supposedly fixed hierarchy.  What the ruler (the Duke in this 
case) will understand if he is a great ruler – and Federico da Montefeltro most certainly was - 
is the political importance of precipitating and maintaining this “fixed” hierarchy out of the 
movement of agency; and thus it is his task (and that of his trusted agents) to be master of the 
law of agency, to comprehend it and play it effectively by means of, for instance, a contract 
such as that above, and the consequences of the action it requires – in this case, architecture. 
There is something, according to a certain quite pervasive logic, to be deprecated in this 
process of substitution.  In general, the agent is perforce in the position of the parasite.  
Specifically, it will be said that the architect is not involved in the action itself, but instead is 
managing, overseeing, directing, criticising and removing resources from the thing itself 
which needs to be achieved, the real matter at hand – in this case the actual construction of the 
ravelin, the good, honest and uncomplicated labour of the laying of stone on stone.  Not 
responsible in person but, if at all (slippery status that it is), as a bystander who nonetheless 
demands their cut, their percentage, the architect as agent we might say is the very figure of 
the useless, or worse-than-useless, disrupting the presence of the true master to the true 
servant by rerouting or diverting the immediate intentions of the former as directed toward the 
latter.   
This pervasive logic is explicated by Badiou, in his atheistic book on Saint Paul
2, where he 
necessarily uses the term sin in this regard, and links it, as Paul does, to the place of contract, 
of writing, that is, of law: 
Sin is the life of death.  It is that of which the law, and the law alone, is capable….. Paul is striving to 
articulate a de-centring of the subject, a particularly contorted form of its division.  Since the subject of life 
is in the place of death and vice versa, it follows that knowledge and will, on the one hand, agency and 
action, on the other, are entirely disconnected.
3 
The meaning of law is that agency as action (our first meaning) is stained by agency as 
separation (our second): “For Paul, the man of the law is one in whom doing is separated from 
thinking… sin is not so much a fault as living thought’s inability to prescribe action.”  For 
Paul, the structure of sin is the disruption of intentionality within the subject by means of the 
law; likewise, the action of the law in sustaining the movement of agency disrupts the 
intention of the principal, of the “Lord”, and by means of the letter of the contract reroutes it 
via in this case the exemplary agent, the architect. 
As with all phenomena of foundational importance, this movement plays both ways.  Saint 
Paul says: the law breaks the immediacy of action, and this is sin; agency as separation from 
original intention is introduced.  We say: agency, as original separation from intention, as the 
                                             
2 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul – the foundation of universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003).  As Giles Deleuze notes (in Logic of Sensation translate by Daniel W Smith (London: Continuum, 
2003), p.124, “Christianity contains a germ of tranquil atheism” which Badiou makes use of in his book.  We do 
not need to have faith in order to appreciate the momentous structural task Paul of Tartus accomplishes. 
3 Ibid, p.83.  Badiou links this with Lacan’s famous anti-Cartesian thought of the subject: there where I think I am 
not, and there where I am, I do not think.  Jacques Lacan, Écrits A Selection trans. Alan Sherridan 
(London:Routledge, 1977), p.166.  The title of Lacan’s essay is relevant to our topic:  The Agency of the Letter in 
the Unconscious; or, Reason since Freud.   break between knowledge/will and agency as action, is what “causes” law to exist in the first 
place.  If there were no agency (as separation) there would be no law.  The law is the means 
of dealing with the non-presentness of an action, both in terms of contractual arrangements 
(as exemplified by the written building agreement at Costacciaro) – which are only necessary 
because the principal is not present when the works are being done – and in terms of criminal 
law where adjudication occurs within the rule of law whilst taking account (and making an 
account of) the non-presence of a past (illegal) act.   “Cause” is in fact the wrong term here: 
instead, a reciprocal conditioning is at work between law and agency such that we cannot 
grant one the position of being a cause, of being first (either logically or temporally).  
Between them lies not a relation of cause and effect, but rather a disjunctive relation of 
community, to use Kant’s terminology from his table of categories in the first critique
4, 
where, not coincidentally, the relation is characterised as one of the interplay of “agent” and 
“patient”.   
In the case of the building contract at Costacciaro, it can be shown that this stain of Pauline 
sin marks each member of the chain of agency in which Francesco di Giorgio sits, both 
empirically and essentially.   (The one exception to this is that being which is defined as 
exception itself, namely the Lord, the godhead; the further definition of which is to lack this 
stain, to lack sin.)  Taking the Duke Federico da Montefeltro and to speak empirically: an 
illegitimate son, his position as ruler of Urbino and Gubbio was obtained only after his 
younger half-bother was assassinated – an act for which suspicion has long fallen on Federico 
himself
5.   To speak essentially: this particular stain is only an instance of the general rule that 
an earthly sovereign is guilty, that is, can only have gained their position through a necessary 
fault that runs through all moments of foundation (of a state, dynasty or rule).
6 
But whilst the law and sin are thus shown to be unavoidable, Saint Paul famously frees us 
from them by means of salvation, and, by this ideational act of creating and setting into effect 
salvation, establishes the world religion of Christianity in its Pauline cast.  What does this 
“salvation” mean? Two things, according to Badiou.  The first is “that thought can be 
unseparated from doing and power”, that “the divided figure of the subject maintains thought 
in the power of doing.”
7  This Badiou calls a “truth procedure”, a process or event of truth 
which he explicates elsewhere.
8  The fact that it is a “truth procedure” is the reason why it is 
effective in instaurating a world religion,  and he links this procedure here to grace, which is 
the possibility for a “pure act”, pure agency. 
The second meaning of salvation is revealed by its disjunction from “reward” or “wage”, that 
is from what is contractually owed: as Badiou says, “it pertains to the granting of a gift, 
kharisma.”
9 
To return to the specifics of architecture and Costacciaro, and now to save the situation there 
from a parasitical deprecation: it is in this possibility of salvation by means of the granting of 
a gift that we might hope to see the ethical task of the architect as agent, a task which reaches 
                                             
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans Normal Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929), p.113 [B106]. 
5 See Robert Kirkbride, Architecture and Memory – The Renaissance Studioli of Federico da Montefeltro (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p.13 and p.32.  
6 See the work of René Girard in this regard, particularly his The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (London: 
Athlone, 1986). 
7 Alain Badiou, op. cit., p. 84.   
8 See Alain Badiou, Being and Event trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005), Meditation 35 – Theory of 
the Subject; and “The Political as Truth Procedure” in Metapolitics trans. Barbara P. Fulks (New York: Verso, 
2005). 
9 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul., p.77. beyond the contractual and calculated legal relations in which she necessarily stands.  It 
reaches beyond these written relations towards what is not mentioned in the Costacciaro 
contract, namely the community itself
10 for which the town is constructed.  The community is 
that body towards which the architect acts as an unwritten and uncontracted agent, just as the 
Duke, for all his invocation of analogies with his Lord in heaven (such invocations being the 
routine ruse of power), rules by virtue of and as agent of the community which brought him to 
power
11. 
Why do we claim that the architect acts as agent for the community?  For in this claim we 
wish to posit that unless - outside all contractual, legal, rewarded and predicable duties – the 
architect acts as generous agent towards the community, unless a gift occurs in the creation of 
the work, then there will be no such thing as architecture, properly defined.  And this 
occurrence of the gift is the location of an ethics of architecture – an ethics necessarily outside 
the realm of law, just as justice is also beyond the law. 
The architect acts as agent for the community because, if it is to be possible for a gift of 
architecture to be granted to it, then architecture must be defined thus: as an active and 
eventful reciprocity which engages the community.  In no other manner could it be possible 
for such a gift to occur.  Since the specific nature of architecture concerns the environment  -
buildings, places, landscape - this engaging reciprocity is for it the interplay between 
people/community and place/buildings; or between subject (us, community) and object 
(buildings).  Architecture is inherently situational, in the meaning of the term which Sartre 
gives it: “the situation is a relation of being between a for-itself [us] and the in-itself 
[“objects”, environment] which the for-itself nihilates…. The situation is the subject 
illuminating things by his very surpassing...”
12  Architecture is inherently disjunctive, to again 
use the term from Kant’s table of categories: it is to do with the reciprocity of agent and 
patient (in this case, people and place), a relation which itself is termed one of community
13. 
The architect acts as agent for the community insofar as she has a view to the communal – 
that is, situational and disjunctive – being of architecture.  This act of respect has, necessarily, 
the nature of a gift; it will only occur beyond any rule of law, beyond any contract, and 
beyond any duty.  In the case to hand: there is a so-called pragmatic task for the architecture 
to fulfil, namely the protection of the fabric of the town and the Duke’s realm by means of a 
defensive bastion and tower.  If the work of architecture does not achieve this, then the legal 
requirements have not been discharged.  But this is a necessary and not sufficient condition 
for what the architect should achieve; or, better put, the pragmatic aspect should only be an 
effect of analysis and reduction after the event, not at the origin of the creative and generous 
act.  The creative and generous act of the architect is to operate on and maintain the scope of 
an unreduced situation.  The sign of this at Costacciaro is explicitly given in the terrible and 
unexpected beauty of the ravelin – why, according to the law, should a bastion be beautiful? – 
and less explicitly and perhaps more intriguingly in the simple and everyday beauty of the 
tower. 
                                             
10 The full form of the contract does include a reference to the commune of Costacciaro, but only insofar as they 
are to provide building materials delivered to the site. 
11 As noted in Kirkbride op cit, see James Dennistoun, Memoires of the Dukes of Urbino (London: Longman, 
Brown, Green and Longmans, 1851), vol. 1 p.417-20 for details of the written constitutional agreement signed 
between Federico and the citizens of Urbino before they permitted him to enter the city to become ruler. 
12 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness trans. Hazel E Barnes (London: Methuen, 1958), p.549. 
13 loc. cit. Or, to put it another way, architecture is inherently theatrical in the meaning of the term which Michael 
Fried gives it when he used it disparagingly to describe minimalist or “literal” art. Cf .Michael Fried, “Art and 
Objecthood”, in Art Forum 5 (June 1967), p.12-23. Finally, and more radically, the work of architecture is to have the nature of a gift because the 
community to which this gift is given does not yet exist.  It is a community to come
14, a 
community of future possibility, a community of those who perhaps have nothing in common 
aside from that which may come to occur by means of the architecture thus thought and 
created.  It is not simply that the community of Costacciaro as a legal body is not party to the 
formal contract between architect, Duke and builder, since we can envisage that they might 
well be; but more that the community thought outside the law and thought in terms of an 
eventful architecture cannot possibily be party to a contract.  There is nothing there of which 
the architect could be an agent except a sort of ghostly presence – if we can imagine such a 
thing as a futurial ghost, the ghost of an architecture or community to come.  And yet the 
architect, in acknowledging the essentially futurial nature of architecture, should – it is a 
matter of ethics that she does – respond as this spectre’s agent.  We see that on the one hand 
the architect envisages the battle-to-come which will rage around the bastion- and tower-to-
come, and gives that untameable event an indeterminable and open possibility or series of 
possibilities; and on the other, the uncalled-for event of beauty will occur here for one who 
approaches these architectural works from out of an unknown future.  The agent of the future 
unknown: such might be the situation of architecture. 
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